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Abstract
This article focuses on the strategies and processes of institutional design. It starts
by recognizing that politicians often try to change institutional structures of net-
works and therefore more theoretical and empirical attention for these strategies
is needed. First, the article provides a brief theoretical framework for understand-
ing institutional changes and identifying institutional design strategies. Then it illus-
trates the framework by in-depth empirical research of the institutional changes in
the Dutch fishery network as a result of the interventions of the European Union.
The article first elaborates the strategic interventions of the EU and then traces the
changes of rules as constructed and reconstructed by the actors in the network.
The article ends by assessing the influence of the EU interventions and also by 
presenting some reflections on the concept of institutional design.
Points for practitioners
In policy-making we face a paradox. Although generally it is recognized that insti-
tutions are hard to change, many politicians initiate institutional interventions to
change policy outcomes and policy processes. Since these changes mostly are
aimed at changes in complex networks of actors that are engaged in producing
policy outputs or service delivery this makes the realization of these interventions
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even harder. This article first provides a way to identify and understand strategies
of institutional design. But it also provides insight into how interventions of the
European Union, in this case in the fields of fishery policies, work out in national
policy domains, in this case the Dutch national fishery network. But the article also
contains a warning. Institutional design strategies disrupt institutional structures
that have been created over the years. They thus threaten existing social capital
and also, very importantly, create uncertainty. Because once institutional rules of
networks are being changed there is only a long and difficult way back if the 
interventions turn out to be undesirable.
1. Introduction: institutional design as a governing strategy
Although rarely cited in political talk, ‘institutional design’ is one of the most promi-
nent governing strategies used by politicians and administrators. It is a means to
achieve better outcomes, prevent undesirable outcomes or change outcomes of
public policy. In fact politicians are constantly busy with changing and adjusting struc-
tures of institutional arrangements when their outcomes are not to their liking.
Examples are easy to find. There is the international trend to create autonomous 
governmental organizations in almost all western countries (Pollitt et al., 2001), which
has arguably changed the decision-making space of these organizations, as well as
their relations with parent departments. It can be said that the authority rules and
rules for interactions in the networks in which they function have changed.
Despite the practical importance of institutional design not much can be found in
terms of conceptual framework or detailed analysis on this issue. Where it does exist
most of the conceptual work is abstract and more focused on analysing institutions
rather than institutional design. Although we can find several institutional analyses
ranging from neo-institutional perspective to more political science oriented work
(Scott, 1995; March and Olsen, 1989), we do not find many detailed analyses of the
changes in rules as actors view and construct them. This article aims to present both
a conceptual scheme to analyse institutional design strategies and provide a detailed
analysis of the changes in the constructed rules that actors use in a concrete network,
the Dutch fishery network. To this extent the article tries to contribute to the theoriz-
ing of the idea of institutional design, as well as to the way empirical research about
this issue can be applied.
The focus of the analysis is the relationship between the European Union and its
separate national networks. The European Union, with its many attempts to change
the policy-making of national governments by new legislation and other measures,
surely is one of the most important public actors engaged in institutional design.
Given the research of the last decennia (Hanf and Scharpf, 1978; Richardson and
Jordan, 1979; Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992), which indicates
that policy-making and implementation processes take place in networks of actors,
the institutional design measures of the European Union can be interpreted as 
aiming to influence networks operating at the national level. By focusing on the
Dutch fishery network, this article contributes to the analysis of the effects of EU 
policy interventions upon national networks.
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What is institutional design?
As the words indicate, institutional design is aimed at changing the institutional char-
acteristics of — in our case — networks. Institutional design can roughly be described
as interventions that try to change the institutional structure, that is, the set of rules
used in policy networks (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2006). It is not directly aimed at the
process of interactions or concrete outputs, but at the set of rules which regulate
these interactions and the way in which outcomes are produced. As such, institu-
tional design is an indirect way of governance although certainly not an unimportant
one.
The ‘quest for institutional design’ is undoubtedly related to the view held by
many politicians and administrators that the outcomes of public policy, as well as the
way chains of actors deal with societal problems, have been unsatisfactory. It is also,
however, related to the growing importance of (dealing with) complex problems. The
more we need innovative solutions, which require the cooperation of many actors
from different sectors, and the more problems are experienced, which seem to be
difficult to address in the existing networks, the tendency to restructure networks or
initiate large-scale operations becomes greater. The pressing problems of the dimin-
ishing number of fish in the North Sea is an example of a problem that from the 
perspective of the European Union requires radical measures. The EU actively tries to
intervene and change national fishery networks in order to change ideas and behav-
iour in the long term.
The content of this article
There are thus important reasons to look at the phenomenon of institutional design
more closely, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. We will first explore the 
phenomenon theoretically. We build on network theory (Hanf and Scharpf, 1978;
Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004) to work out a conceptual scheme with which we can
analyse interventions in the institutional characteristics of networks. With this concep-
tual scheme we analyse the institutional design interventions of the European Union
in the national fishery networks. In this case we trace the influence of these interven-
tions on the Dutch fishery network between 1990 and 2000. We will present a
detailed analysis of the changes in rules within the network and try to assess the
impact that the EU interventions have on that change. The rules and changes in rules
are treated as the dependent variable in this analysis, while the changes in the strate-
gies of the actors (partly) in reaction to the interventions of the EU are treated as the
independent variable.
As has already been mentioned, the second section of this article will focus on 
the conceptual framework we have developed. In section 3 we discuss the Dutch
fisheries network and its relation to the European Union. A sketch of EU interventions
and the developments in the Dutch fishery network follow this. We then analyse the
results of the process of institutional redesign (section 6) by comparing the sets of
institutional rules in 1990 and 2000. Finally, we address the consequences and
impact of the EU intervention especially for the Product Board, a typically Dutch
arrangement (section 7), and reflect on the potency to use institutional design as a
governance strategy (section 8).1
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2. Institutional design in networks: an analytical perspective
Institutions structure the behaviour of actors. They set conditions for interactions,
shape perceptions of actors, limit their strategic actions and construct their evaluation
and appreciation mechanism. Looking at the institutional characteristics of networks
is essentially looking at a supra-individual explanation for the behaviour of actors
(Scott, 1995). It is not the case that actors or their actions do not matter but actors act
within bounds formed by institutions. Institutions are ordering principles in a complex
reality.
Institutions as rules: formation and change
Institutions and institutional arrangements are often regarded as sets of formal and
informal rules (see Ostrom, 1986; March and Olsen, 1989; Klijn, 1996, 2001; Scharpf,
1997; Jentoft, 2004). Scharpf (1997: 38) defines institutions as ‘systems of rules that
structure the courses of actions that a set of actors may choose’. Institutions are 
thus sets of rules, and therefore networks must also be considered institutions. Each
network not only has its own history in which it is being shaped and changed, but
also can be distinguished from other networks by its unique set of rules.
Within networks, actors interact in a related series of interactions that we can
define as games. In these games actors and rules from the network (but sometimes
more than one network) are ‘activated’ around a concrete issue (for an elaboration,
see Van Bueren et al., 2003). Rules are, however, also applied, reinterpreted and, in
the longer run, changed.
Although there are of course situations where rules are consciously formed in
games, which have been devised for that purpose (think of establishing laws for
example), rules are usually formed as a by-product during interactions (Knight, 1992;
Klijn, 2001). In other words, rules may be the product of conscious design behaviour
by an actor — usually a public actor — but even then they are only rules if the other
actors in the network recognize them as such and keep to them. Rules that are 
broken by the actors, either consciously or unconsciously, or are not (or are no longer)
complied with, lose their validity (Duintjer, 1977; Burns and Flam, 1987). This also 
clarifies under which conditions rules may change (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). We
identify three possibilities.
First, rules change as a result of a conscious action (design/intervention) by an
actor, provided that this intervention is perceived to be legitimate by other actors in
the network, and is at least complied with (note that this is not necessarily in a literal
sense. We will return to this later).
Second, they can change as a result of reinterpretation by actors; if a number of
actors start to interpret existing rules in a different way (in terms of a judge who tries
to apply abstract rules to concrete offences we could say: create a different jurispru-
dence), rules will change (Burns and Flam, 1987; March and Olsen, 1989).
Finally, sometimes rules change as a result of non-compliance or even conscious
breaking of rules. If actors no longer comply with rules or even consciously break
them and this stance is adopted by other actors and not followed up by effective
negative sanctions, rules will lose their meaning. This process will usually be accom-
panied by the simultaneous formation of new rules (see Van Buuren and Klijn, 2004).
398 International Review of Administrative Sciences 72(3)
The conditions for change in rules can of course also occur simultaneously. The
European Union usually tries to influence national networks by conscious action, but
as a result of that actors may reinterpret existing rules. This also makes clear that the
effects of institutional design are realized in a complex interaction process between
conscious intervention, and interactions after that intervention in which various actors
play their role. The effects of interventions are often a combination of conscious
design and joint strategic actions and the reinterpretations of actors. The essence is,
however, that rules in a network change and these changes can be traced by exam-
ining closely the construction and reconstruction process of the rules by the actors in
the network. This reconstruction of the rules actors use, and their changes, also pro-
vides the analyst with information on the impact of interventions upon institutional
design.
Institutional design: how rules are changed
Various management strategies, which are based on the changing of rules, can be
distinguished. These strategies may be classified into three categories (Koppenjan
and Klijn, 2004).
The first category of strategies is aimed at the network composition. These are
strategies which focus on changing or influencing the composition of the network.
Based upon the premise that the composition of the network has an influence upon
the interactions occurring within it, the aim is to introduce changes that effect this
composition and thereby stimulate different interaction patterns and outcomes.
There are various ways in which the composition of the network may be changed.
For example, strategies aimed at consolidating or changing actors’ positions or
adding new actors. However, strategies may also be aimed at changing the access
rules for actors or influencing the network as a whole by promoting network forma-
tion, self-regulation, or modifications to the system.
The second cluster of strategies is aimed at the network outcomes. These strate-
gies try to influence the standards or the logic of costs and benefits in a sustainable
way so that games within networks evolve in a different way. This is because other
strategic choices are made. The point of intervention here is thus not the actors, as in
the previous set of strategies, but their choices. This means influencing both actors’
strategic choices and the outcomes resulting from them, in a sustainable way. The
most important institutional design strategies in this category are strategies to
change the pay-off structure, such as changing professional codes, morals and strate-
gies, and thereby changing the evaluation criteria of actors.
The final category of strategies is aimed at network interactions. These strategies
try to influence the interactions between actors in a sustainable way. These strategies
are aimed at influencing rules which regulate the process in networks, and in this
way, try to facilitate interactions to put them in a framework or to make linkages.
Strategies in this category include developing conflict settlement mechanisms or
introducing certain procedures into interactions. Certification or influencing super-
visory relationships also fall into this category.
These strategies are aimed directly at changing rules either by direct intervention
upon the rules or by affecting perceptions of actors and their strategies. In this article
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we focus on the institutional design interventions of the EU in the Dutch fisheries net-
work on the one hand and the effects, that is the changes in rules, on the other hand.
We view the fisheries network in a relatively limited sense. The central actors are the
Fisheries Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Dutch Fish Product Board, the
overarching organizations in fisheries (the sector organizations) and (since the 1980s)
the European Union (i.e. its Directorate General for Fisheries). Recently, nature and
environmental interest groups want to join the network, a desire supported by the
‘green policies’ of the EU.
Types of rules: the focus of analysis
To study the institutional structure of a network and changes in that structure, we
need to analyse and describe the types of rules and their content. Various examples
are available in the literature (see, e.g. Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1986; 
Burns and Flam, 1987; Klijn, 1996; Scharpf, 1997). For the purpose of this article, i.e.
studying the changes in the Dutch fishery network as result of interventions of the
European Union and, given the complexity of this (the changes in the fisheries net-
work in the past ten years), we limit the analysis to three categories of rules (see also
Klijn, 2001).
First, we discern domain rules. These determine the division of tasks in the institu-
tional system. Laws and regulations determine the tasks of the Product Board (see
section 3). The same holds for the tasks of governments. Statutes of private organi-
zations also define objectives and tasks. Informal domain agreements may also have
the status of rules. The position of actors is determined as much by implicit and
shared rules about mutual positions in the institutional system as by the formal divi-
sion of tasks.
Second, there are interaction rules. These, among other things, determine what
information is exchanged and how this is done, the consultation patterns between
actors, and how collective decisions are made.
Finally, we focus our attention on evaluation rules. These are rules upon which
actors evaluate the outcomes of their actions, the procedures to be followed, and the
products that are realized. In this specific network, they are especially concerned with
what is considered good fisheries policy and how it is made.
These rules structure the network. Institutional design is aimed at changing these
rules. We can specify institutional design strategies in the light of the different types
of rules. Domain rules are the main rules affected by design strategies that are
focused upon network composition. In contrast, interaction rules are mainly affected
by design strategies that are focused upon network interactions, and institutional
design focused upon network outcomes is, of course, intended to change the evalu-
ation rules.
The research method
A difficulty in the reconstruction of rules is that they do not exist ‘out there’ but are
shaped by actors and, as a result, are a social construction. By necessity, a reconstruc-
tion of rules is therefore the reinterpretation by the researcher (see Klijn, 1996;
Scharpf, 1997). The reconstruction of formal rules is, obviously, much easier.
400 International Review of Administrative Sciences 72(3)
For this article the rules have been reconstructed through interviews with 28
actors in the fisheries network such as associates of the Product Board (PB) (see 
section 3), civil servants of the ministry, and representatives of fisheries organizations
(Van Buuren, 2002). These were among the most influential people in the network
and all had prominent positions in one of the major organizations in the network. In
these interviews, we encouraged interviewees to explicate all sorts of formal and
informal agreements about division of tasks, types of interaction and methods of
evaluation. Especially important was the question of why they regarded certain
actions as self-evident and disapproved of other actions. Implicit assumptions about
‘legitimate behaviour’ were in this way uncovered. By way of controlling, we asked
whether the interviewees could identify with and recognize the reconstructed rules.
In addition, a large number of policy documents were examined. From these we
deduced the impact of European policy interventions on the institutional arrange-
ments in the fisheries network. Finally, a brief survey was sent to all members of the
co-management groups (67 people). Of these, 36 responded (53.7 percent). The
questions were mainly concerned with the functioning of these quasi-autonomous
groups of fishermen (see section 3) and the relations of the fisheries organization
with the PB (Van Buuren, 2002). The data from this survey have been used only 
sparingly.
3. Europe and the Dutch fisheries sector
In this article, we address the impact of European interventions on institutional
changes within the Dutch fisheries network. The study focuses on the European
interventions over the period of the past ten years. After all, with its active fisheries
policy, the EU has had — directly and indirectly — substantial influence on the positions
and relations within national fisheries networks. To focus our analysis, we look espe-
cially at the changing position of the PB as a consequence of this European involve-
ment.
Characteristics of the Dutch fisheries network
There are few Dutch policy sectors that, in recent years, have been subject to the
kinds of pressures experienced in the fisheries sector. At the beginning of the 1980s,
the fisheries network could be characterized as a ‘fisheries policy community’. The
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries operated as a clientele
department and developed policy in the interest of the fisheries. Consultation with
the sector was institutionalized in a public corporation: the Dutch Fish Product Board.
The Dutch Fish PB is characteristically Dutch, although in other European countries
there are comparable intermediary organizations. The Fish PB was created in the
1950s together with other PBs with the enactment of the Corporate Association Act.
The essence of this act was the creation of organizations that would be involved 
in policy-making on behalf of a specific policy sector. The management of these
organizations consisted of representatives from sector organizations and observers
from relevant ministries and the Social-Economic Council (an advisory body for the
cabinet on social-economic policy). The corporation’s task is to support the sector
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with issues of promotion, research and administration. They also have to support
government in the implementation of policy and regulation and are involved in poli-
cy-making. They provide a platform for the sector’s discussions with government
about policy plans. The corporation also has regulative authority and can impose
binding regulations upon companies. The PB thus provides a link between the sector
(mainly the fishery organizations) and the government. Personified by their chair-
persons, the fisheries organizations, namely the Dutch Fishery Association and the
Federation of Fisheries Associations, had strong advocates with substantial public
exposure (Van der Kroon, 1994). Together, they have sought out the best for the 
sector.
The EU and the Dutch fisheries network in the 1980s
This image of a corporatist policy sector was severely challenged in the 1980s. In
1977, European quota regulations were established, and suddenly fishermen were
required to decrease their catches. The shift from fishing to control proceeded with
difficulty, and regulation was massively evaded. Following a European evaluation in
1983, a parliamentary inquiry committee was established. This committee concluded
that civil servants and political officeholders had worked too closely with the interests
of fishermen and their industry. The fisheries interest was too quickly viewed as 
synonymous with national interest (Hoetjes, 1993).
Strict measures politicized the relations. Real physical battles occurred between
fishermen and the police (Kickert, 2002). In 1989, the Minister of Agriculture was
forced to resign because regulations were still not sufficiently followed. His successor
hoped to solve these problems. On his initiative, and together with the Dutch Fish 
PB and the fisheries industry, an effort was made to establish a system of co-
management to strengthen the control of the fishing quota, the Biesheuvel system.
Fishermen received responsibility for quota control. They formed groups in which the
quota were distributed and controlled. In the first instance, oversight and sanctioning
was the responsibility of the management group itself. Trust was slowly re-
established and quota control became increasingly de-politicized. The fisheries sector
remains an independent, closed sector.
With the specific national implementation strategies for the quota regulations, the
institutional impacts of the EU interventions in the Dutch network remain limited. The
main effect was the diminishing position of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture. But the
internal relationships did not change spectacularly.
4. EU interventions and developments in the Dutch fisheries
network 1990–2000
From the early 1990s, the position of the European Union in the national fishery 
policies became stronger and stronger. On four items, the network was put under
pressure and changed considerably. We summarize these four interventions and their
context in Table 1.
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The EU and quota regulations
European quota regulation, partially a result of alarming data about the deteriorating
numbers of fish, was strengthened substantially in the 1990s. In addition, the EU
developed an extensive package of auxiliary policies, such as, for example, technical
measures (about the allowed width of meshes) and sea-day regulations (the number
of days that fishermen can fish at sea), in order to reduce the amount of fishing. Its
‘top-down’ manner of administration — with little attention given to national admin-
istrative culture — is not appreciated. ‘The Commission is just muddling along’, an
associate of the PB remarks: ‘they (the fishermen) are heard, but no one listens’.
The EU overrules the national government and doesn’t reckon with the Dutch
consensual approach. Its top-down approach and the power to enforce compliance
(because of the rather docile attitude of the national government, after the trauma of
the 1980s), gave the EU a powerful position within the Dutch network.
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Table 1 Characteristics of the EU institutional design interventions
Institutional 
design Type of Main rules affected
intervention intervention (see section 5) Comments 
1.Fish quota Mainly aimed at Changing evaluation Unilaterally top-down 
and network outcomes rules (what is profitable measures to limit fish
downsizing and a little bit on and good in the catch. Bypassing the
catch of fish network composition network). Indirect: Ministry of Agriculture
emphasizing the 
domain rule of the EU
2.Stimulating Mainly aimed at Introducing new actors Encouragement to
green issues network composition weakens existing take ecological issues 
in fisheries (stimulating access of domain rules of PB, into account in fishery 
other groups) sector and ministry. policy and politics
3.Stimulating Aimed at network Changing domain By stimulating the
private composition rules: strengthened private organizations
organizations (strengthening actors for private the EU explicitly ignores 
and producer and changing organizations, the PB
organizations relations between weakened for PB
actors in network)
4. Free market Mainly at network Weakened domain This is a general policy 
policy interactions and and interaction rules of the EU not specifically
indirectly on network that were in favour targeted at the fishery 
composition of PB. Strengthened network. It does, 
domain rule of private however, include 
organizations. ignoring and bypassing
the traditional Dutch
organization of the PB.
This forms an extra
impetus for the national
debate about the PB
structure
New issues in the fisheries network: nature and the environment
An important development in European fisheries policy, and thus in national policy, is
the increased attention given to the issue of ‘nature and the environment’. In the
annual reports of the PB, a steady increase in the number of national policy initiatives
in this area is evident (Van Buuren, 2002). European attention to the ecological values
in fisheries policy forces the department to also pay structural attention to this.
Specific nature areas are introduced, as well as ecological indicators, ecosystem tar-
gets, an action on plan biodiversity and the precautionary principle.
It is not so much the ‘greenification’ of fisheries policy that puts pressure on 
mutual relations, but more the manner in which it is implemented. The sector per-
ceives the stream of initiatives, such as the policy memo ‘Sea and Coastal Fisheries’
(see Ministerie van Landbouw, 1993a, 1993b), the establishment of ecosystem
objectives and the policy brief on the welfare of fish, as administrative overdoses.
One respondent remarked:
The sector is confronted with too many initiatives . . . Hence, such a sector is
confronted with ecosystem objectives [initiative of the Ministry of Public Housing,
Planning and Environment] and the next day with the fifth memo on planning
[initiative of the Ministry of Housing] that also contains all sorts of planning regarding
the North Sea. And then someone appears who says: I also have Ecological Quality
Objectives [policy plan of the Ministry of Economic Affairs]. They do not know what
to do with it.
Changing relations in the network: professionalization of the sector
Since private parties were also involved, the PB faced challenges from the private 
sector as well. In the 1990s, fisheries organizations experienced greater professional-
ization. To a large extent, this was a consequence of European policy regarding pro-
ducers’ organizations. The EU, in the Common Market Policy, gave these voluntary
associations of fishermen various market organizing authority. Thus, some tasks of
the PB became superfluous and were abolished. Professionalization also occurred in
the Biesheuvel groups. Together with the producers’ organizations, they were able to
implement the quota regulation and the market organization. The sector itself ini-
tiated consultation among producers’ organizations so that other committees, led by
the PB, ceased to exist or lost their functions. As a result, the PB lost part of its influ-
ence upon cutter-rigged issues. In addition, because of these developments, the PB
could no longer effectively coordinate the Biesheuvel system. The group meetings,
chaired by the PB, were convened more infrequently. The fisheries organizations
themselves acquired the means to expand their secretarial function so that their 
representatives (some individuals who have leading positions) had more time to
build and expand the fisheries lobby.
The results of our survey supported these conclusions. The respondents are not
satisfied about the way the PB defended their interests. The producers’ organization
is seen as becoming more and more important. In their concrete actions, we see an
increased use of ‘own’ organizations and a neglecting of the fish PB (see Figure 1).
Many in the fisheries world regarded the producers’ organization as the organiza-
tion of the future, and they wanted to invest in this, at the cost of the PB. The joint
meetings of the producers’ organizations gained in importance.
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The PB, on the other hand, increasingly profiled itself as a vanguard institute that
desired to fulfil a meaningful role for the sector and the ministry. It sought to facilitate
the transformation to a more durable fisheries sector. To that end, it developed vari-
ous initiatives, but the scepticism in the sector greatly inhibited this.
The PB attempted to streamline negotiations between sector and government
and to integrate it through its own channels. But this was not always successful since
it met with resistance from the sector and with pragmatism in the ministry. In the
development of the Biesheuvel system, we can certainly recognize that the PB was
marginalized and forced to give up its role almost entirely.
The Dutch Fish Product Board in a free market
The battle faced by the fisheries sector was intensified by the political discussion
about the public corporation system in the 1990s. An important argument in favour
of revising the system was the relation of the PBs to European regulations. The con-
cern was that the Dutch Product Boards were not tailored to European policy, which
favoured free market objectives and market organization through private producer
organizations. A public organization had no place there. As a result, a number of
competencies were removed from the PBs.
The PB doesn’t fit within the European doctrine about the role of government in
relation to the free market. It is an intermingling of public and private elements and a
‘not-allowed’ association of private businesses. In their policy the EU obviously neg-
lect the PBs. The former chairman of the Fish PB participates in European policy
processes as the representative of the united private fisheries organization. Other-
wise, he would not be allowed to participate!
This change was part of a much larger (national) debate about the manner in
which the relations between the government and the private sector were shaped. In
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Figure 1 Opinions of the sector about the Fish PB and producers’ organizations 
(n = 36)
The Fish Corporation The producers’
has to stand up more organizations have gained 
for the fisheries interests more and more importance
(totally) disagree
don’t agree/don’t disagree
(totally) agree
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
part as a consequence of this argument, the PB system came under pressure during
the so-called Purple cabinets (1994–2002; in which socialist, liberal and democratic
parties governed together). Consequently, the Fish PB had to prove itself time and
again (SER, 2000). The sector had already criticized the way in which the Fish PB 
exercised its duties (see below), and this critique became more vehement as a result
of this development. Because of the PB discussion and the resulting limitations on its
functioning, the PB gradually lost its added value for the fisheries. For example, the
obligation of the ministry to request advice about intended policy from the PB was
abolished and oversight on the regulative competency of the PB was strengthened.
The informal patterns of mutual contacts and information exchange between the
Fisheries Directorate and the PB continued to exist, but the discretion of the latter was
decreased.
Conclusion: a network under pressure
An important consequence of European involvement in Dutch fisheries was that 
the network was put under pressure in the 1990s. Partly by connecting to existing
developments (the discussion about the position of the Fish Corporation and the pro-
fessionalization of the sector), but also partly by self-imposed developments (quota
regulation, greenification), the EU interventions heavily affect the institutional relations
in the network. We will explore the consequences in the next section.
5. Changing rules in the fisheries network
As indicated in section 3, the EU stimulated a change trajectory in the Dutch fisheries
network. The network was broken open effectively and the room to deal with issues
internally in a discrete manner was diminished. Some interventions were further
enhanced by network internal developments (professionalization of the sector, dis-
cussion about the PB). The classic corporatist rules in the network were hollowed out
as a result of all these developments. The consequences of the (direct and indirect)
interventions of the EU in the institutional structure of the fisheries network, that is the
basic rules of the network, are analysed in this section.
Domain rules in 1990: live and let live
The most important domain rules in the early 1990s expressed a ‘live and let live’ 
attitude in the fisheries. Everyone knew their place in the corporatist network, and
national regulations were made in consultation. The PB’s role as platform placed it in
an advantageous position in policy advising. Its standpoints were developed in inten-
sive consultation with the sector. Despite this, the PB was not exactly appreciated in
the fisheries sector. Fishermen were averse to any type of governmental interference.
They could not get around the PB or influence it, but they could organize themselves.
In their perception it was a costly institution. The ‘live and let live’ doctrine culminated
in the rule: What can be done privately must be done privately. Initially the EU held
back, with the exception of the quota regulation and the market organization. The
Ministry of Agriculture held political primacy, but used it cautiously because it valued
support for its policies (see also Bekke et al., 1994).
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Changes in domain rules
The various developments in the fisheries network during the 1990s had important
consequences for the domains of the various actors in the network. The EU was able
to unilaterally expand its domain. The ministry, as a consequence, lost much of its 
policy discretion. The sector and the PB complained, but were unable to turn the tide.
While the ‘purple polarization’ and the ‘greenification’ basically amounted to an 
interventionist strategy on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture, the EU ultimately
overrode them. As a consequence of the PB debate, the PB lost influence:
When I came here [some 20 years ago], the Industrial and the Product Board were
‘gentlemen’ of great authority. They had real influence because of their formal
authority. This was a public corporate organisation. They determined what happened.
But all that is gone.
The strong involvement of Brussels forced the Fisheries Directorate to transform itself
from a sector directorate to a more neutral policy directorate. As a result, relations
with the sector became less intimate, and the sector was forced to learn to deal 
with its own problems, such as fisheries issues addressed by other ministries (e.g.
social-economic issues).
The rule ‘What can be done privately, must be done privately’ was upheld, and
obviously especially by the private parties. They managed to enhance their domain
with the help of the EU and were no longer as dependent upon the PB:
Hence we can also get finances through the avenue of private Producers
Organisations in order to professionalise the organisation. Thus the argument of the
PB [that they are the only one who have the means to make joint action possible] is
no longer as strong.
The most important changes in the domain rules are provided in Table 2.
Interaction rules: corporatism in optima forma
The interaction rules ‘regulated’ the relations between actors in the fisheries network.
The PB offered a consultation platform for the sector (the Committee for International
Affairs for issues concerning the market organization and the Cutter Committee 
for cutter-rigged boats). The PB also provided a platform for consultation between
minister and sector in the ‘Regular Supply Consultation’. The relation between the
ministry and the PB took the shape of the latter having the right to advise with regard
to intended policy and oversight of the ministry on regulations by the PB.
Changes in interaction rules
The political debate about the organization of the representation of the private inter-
ests by the PB changed the relations between the ministry and the PB, especially
because the obligation of advising was abolished. Requesting advice became volun-
tary: ‘Presently it is nothing more than a neighbourly service. It is much more like ”Let
us not start on the wrong foot with this regulation. Let’s ask advice.” But I must say,
this is not the standard’, according to a civil servant from the Agriculture Ministry.
The professionalization of the sector resulted in preference being given to inter-
actions internal to the sector over interactions through the PB. The sector considered
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Table 2 Changing domain rules
Domain rules
1990 Within policy discretion defined by national governments,
the EU sets frameworks for national fishery policies. 
This is especially with regard to market organization, Emphasized
capacity reduction and catch regulation
2000 Within the room for policy discretion defined by national 
government, the EU determines national fisheries policy
1990–2000 The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for national Unchanged
fisheries policy within the framework set by the EU
1990–2000 The PB represents the interests of the sector, taking Unchanged, 
general interest into account, supports the sector where but 
it considers it necessary and cooperates in the contested
implementation of government policy
1990–2000 The sector organizations look after the interests of their More strictly
members, the fishermen enforced
1990–2000 The fisherman is king on his ship and does not wish to Unchanged
be under patronage when unnecessary. It is necessary 
to convince him of the use of intended measures
1990–2000 What can be done privately must be done privately. More strictly
Only when a task cannot be performed by private actors enforced
can it be the responsibility of the PB
1990–2000 Branch organizations have a decisive voice in the activities Unchanged
of the PB (veto power)
1990–2000 The PB prepares common sector standpoints and Unchanged
represents these
1990–2000 Branch organizations have the right to independently Unchanged
take their own standpoint
1990 Within the frameworks set by government the PB has an 
autonomous regulative authority. The board determines More
the more detailed content of policy. Government restrictively
oversight is marginal interpreted 
2000 Within the boundaries set by national government the 
PB has autonomous regulative authority
1990–2000 Public primacy: national government determines to Emphasized
what degree it will take responsibility for the content and 
implementation of its policy
1990 The Fisheries Directorate takes care of the fisheries 
interests within national government
2000 The Fisheries Directorate focuses on general policy; Changed
the sector looks after the fisheries interest in the Ministry 
and elsewhere
1990 The PB can advise government about intended policy 
and regulation Changed
2000 When considered necessary, the Ministry will request 
advice from the PB
2000 The producer organizations operate in a market New
organizing manner and ‘manage’ the catch regulation 
together with the group
the Producers’ Organization consultation sufficient for regulating its affairs (concern-
ing fishing quotas and market regulation) in the direction of ‘Brussels’. The PB became
increasingly marginalized as a platform for the sector.
Evaluation rules: fisheries interests are general interests
The relevant evaluation rules (with which those involved evaluate the results of 
policy type interactions in the fisheries network; see Table 3) assume strongly that
fisheries policy and fisheries interests are synonymous. Furthermore, actors regard it
as self-evident that the results of policy processes are only good when accepted by
the sector.
These rules remained almost implicit until their validity became the subject of 
discussion. This was especially the case with the ‘support rule’. Tinkering with this 
rule determined the problems in the 1980s (quota management) and the solution
direction in the 1990s (co-management). One respondent remarked: ‘In the end, the
government has the authority to push issues through but to a large extent, it will con-
sider what support it has.’ In general, this rule remains in the fisheries network
(Dorren, 1996).
The problems in the 1980s were mainly a consequence of the fishermen’s per-
ceptions about the lack of legitimacy of European regulations. Also, policy did not
serve the short-term interest of the fishermen. One of their leaders said succinctly: ‘If
it is not between the ears of the fishermen, you need one-on-one supervisors.
Otherwise it is simply not going to work.’
Changes in evaluation rules
The self-evidence of the notion that the fisheries interest must be served by fisheries
policy clearly diminished as a result of EU interventions and the discussions about the
environment. The standard of good fisheries policy clearly shifted although there was
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Table 3 Interaction rules in the fisheries network
1990 In PB’s International Affairs Committee, market organization 
is discussed. Producer Organizations (POs) are represented
there. Together they determine the standpoint with regard 
to Europe. In the PB’s Cutter Committee, the sector Changed
determines its standpoints on cutter issues
2000 In the producers’ meetings the sector regulates as far as it 
can matters concerning cutters
1990–2000 The Supply Issues Committee addresses all issues  Weakened
concerning supply
1990–2000 In the regular supply meeting with the minister, the sector Unchanged
discusses the entire state of affairs with the government
1990 Agreement with ordinances from the ministry involved is 
sufficient for an ordinance to be passed
2000 Agreement with the Social-Economic Council, the European Changed
Commission and the ministry involved is necessary before a 
regulation is enacted
no unanimous agreement about its direction. In this sense, a development can be
seen from a more or less uniformly shared understanding about the standard of
good fisheries policy to a different somewhat ambiguous standard that was, at least,
broader. The support rule was still relevant, certainly in the eyes of the sector, but not
at any price. In sum, the EU adds some important evaluation criteria to the national
policy discourse. Table 4 provides an overview of the changes in these evaluation
rules.
Conclusion
In general, we see how the fishery network is broken open by the interventions of
the EU. The position of the Product Board is severely challenged by a professionalized
sector and the much broader task orientation of the ministry. The interventions of the
EU have dramatically changed positions and interaction rules. In the next section we
analyse the specific dynamics of institutional design and make some general conclu-
sions.
6. The impact of institutional design
From a comparison of the two sets of rules, the effects of the intervention of the
European Union become clear. Many domain, interaction and evaluation rules
changed during the period 1990–2002. However, the patterns in which the institu-
tional changes occurred were not always the same. Some rules changed very clearly,
while others became ambiguous. There were a lot of complications when the EU
tried to restructure the Dutch fisheries network.
Patterns of change
Sometimes it happens easily: the professionalization of the private organizations is an
example of a rather successful intervention, which supported developments already
under way in the network. But the discussion about the quota raised heavy protest
from the Dutch fishery network. Only through a long process of pushing and pulling
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Table 4 Changing evaluation rules
1990 Policy is for and by the fisheries. Fisheries policy serves 
the fisheries interest. An efficient exploitation of the ‘sources 
of the sea’ is the objective
2000 Fisheries policy serves both the nature and the fisheries Changed
interests. Attempts are made to reconcile fisheries interests 
with ecological values. A sustainable, ecologically responsible 
fishery is the objective
1990–2000 Support in the sector for policy intentions must be pursued Unchanged,
as much as possible. In order to get this there is regular and ambiguous
ad hoc consultation with the sector
1990 Policy is legitimate when fisheries sector and politics agree
2000 Policy is legitimate when sector, politics and society Changed
(nature interests) all agree
(one has to take into account that the first intervention dated from the early 1980s),
did the EU succeed in getting the position it needed to effectively implement its 
policy ambitions. And this position is still not undisputed. Thus if we look at the 
experiences in the Dutch fisheries network we can see an important distinction in 
the dynamics of institutional design. When an institutional intervention hooks onto a
current development within the network acceleration can take place. When an inter-
vention opposes such a development, much more energy is needed to realize a
restructuring of the network.
The second observation would be that the outcomes of a process of institutional
design couldn’t be known in advance. Actors react strategically to these attempts, try
to make an interpretation of the intervention and thereby shape and change inter-
ventions in institutional design. So the evaluation of strategies of institutional design
requires a careful look at the developments and changes in rules in the networks and
the strategic patterns that are the result of institutional design interventions. One also
needs a picture of the trajectory in which changes take place. In this article this is
attempted by studying the changes in rules over time. It could of course be desirable
to extend this analysis through a more dynamic and long-range view of the actors’
strategies and the patterns than we have been able to undertake here.
Unintended or intended?
Some of the institutional design strategies are not always an intended policy strategy.
A key objective of the EU is realizing a free internal market. Product Boards don’t 
fit with this image and the EU left the PBs alone. They were neglected. But when a
discussion in Dutch politics arose, the arguments of Europeanization and the free
market were used in order to diminish the position of the PBs. In other words,
European arguments were used in order to realize national policy ambitions. In Table
5 we summarize the differences in types of institutional design attempts and their
effectiveness.
7. Institutional design: some reflections
We have seen that the European interventions in the Dutch fisheries network have
restructured the network in an important way. They reinforce existing developments,
bring about new trends and bend existing trends in other directions. By doing so the
fisheries network is restyled in a relatively durable way. New or changed relations are
crystallized, other power dependencies have developed, new actors have entered
the network, and other criteria are introduced with regard to the interactions
between actors and the output of their collective actions. In this concluding section
we reflect upon our empirical findings and on the idea of institutional design.
Adapting rather than radically changing the rules: trajectories
The interventions of institutional design tend to occur within the existing sets of rules
of networks and do not lead to an entirely new set of rules, which is of course not 
surprising (Jentoft, 2004). Institutions are relatively durable because they are an
expression of underlying ideas and the solidification of them (Skogstad, 1998).
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Normally, this does set some limitations and narrows the possibilities of institutional
design strategies. Politicians, in particular, do not always seem to realize this point suf-
ficiently themselves. But the media also focus very much on the apparent measure-
ments of politicians instead of the long trajectories which follow.
The other side of the coin of long implementation processes is that path depend-
encies are strong but they also mean that changes, once they are ‘implemented’, 
cannot be undone in an instrumental way. Past sets of rules simply do not exist any-
more. It is thus very unlikely that the changed relationship between fishery organiza-
tions and Product Board will be restored in the old situation.
Normative and research implications of trajectories
This finding has two implications: a normative and a research implication.
The normative implication is that every initiator of institutional design should be
very aware of what they are doing. After all, institutional design not only ‘destroys’ the
existing social infrastructure and replaces it with a new one, but it is also a one-way
street. If one regrets the changes made it is not possible to revert back to old posi-
tions (see Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004) as the empirical analysis in this article makes
clear. This might be a reason for some hesitation with strategies of institutional
design. Given the popularity of institutional design with politicians and the sometimes
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Table 5 Effects of EU institutional interventions
EU Against or with the Institutional 
intervention ‘flow’ of the network effects Effective?
Fish quota and Against the flow Over a long period Yes, but only after a
downsizing (1970–2003) the long period of pushing 
catch of fish closed fisheries network and pulling. And effects
is opened and classical remain uncertain
positions are changed
Stimulating More or less with In a decade ‘green The joint effort of the
green issues the flow (also evaluation criteria’ EU and nature
in fisheries stimulates became the only valid organizations led to
network internal standards for evaluating the opening of a closed
development) fisheries policy. ministry—sector 
network
Stimulating With the flow Important: the private Yes, the PB has a 
private organizations become serious problem in 
organizations powerful players in finding new tasks with
in fishery the network, while added value for the 
network the position of the sector
PB marginalizes
Free market Neither of these, New actors (POs), Yes, a strong EU
policy pragmatic used to diminished position interventional policy
legitimate network for PB and Ministry results in large changes
internal development of Agriculture
confusing, opposite directions initiated in a relatively short period of time, this may
not be a bad thing.
The finding that institutional design strategies reach their full effect slowly in long
trajectories has the consequence that research about these effects of institutional
design can only be examined by ‘close reading’. If one wants to analyse the effects of
institutional design interventions, a close look at the developments within networks
and a good reconstruction of the rules and their changes, it is essential to get a 
realistic picture. The coping strategies of actors and their reinterpretation of existing
rules, as well as the outcomes of that process, should be the focus of the analysis if
we want to understand anything of institutional design. We think we have shown the
value of such a ‘close reading’ in this article.
Institutional design: an effective strategy?
If we look at the design strategies used by the EU, it is clear that different types of
strategies (aimed at composition, interactions or outcomes) are used at the same
time in interventions. This has the consequence that research about successful insti-
tutional design should be looking more at the ‘successful mix’ of intervention strat-
egies than the successful strategy. This is not so strange if one considers that the
initiator seeks to enhance their changes as much as possible, and therefore will prob-
ably use more than one strategy at a time. This, of course, makes it difficult to assess
the influence of each strategy on its own. But the suggested conceptual scheme in
this article at least makes it possible to identify various types of strategies and the
form they take in real life.
This aside, one can observe that the strategies of the European Union are certainly
successful, although they are also supported by national developments. Although it is
of course difficult to deduce success from one case, the persistence of the direction,
the strong power of the European Union, and the fact that some of the changes were
clearly ‘with the flow’ of the already existing developments of the Dutch fishery 
network all contributed to the success. In that sense it becomes clear that attempts
at institutional design certainly can be successful, although they need time and con-
sistency to create the desired effects. In the long run institutional design is possibly
more effective than direct policy interventions. Since successful institutional design
causes changes within embedded idea structures, power relations, and frames of 
reference, its effect is much more important than optimizing the behaviour of gov-
ernmental actors within policy networks. This also means that institutional design
could create much damage if the direction and implementation are wrong. We there-
fore return to an earlier remark of caution in this article: initiators of institutional
design should carefully consider the directions and effects of their attempts because
the effects could be very harmful and there is only a difficult way back.
Note
1 It is important to note that in this period the Dutch fisheries network was also influenced by
national developments, other strategies of the national government, the rise of nature
organizations, and the professionalization of the private sector organizations. These
developments were strengthened by European interventions. It is difficult to separate these
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two types of events. However, in this article we try to isolate the impact of European measures
on the institutional characteristics of the network. In the case description we will specify what
we see as the influence of European interventions and of national developments on the Dutch
fisheries network. We analyse how European interventions amplify or dampen national
developments. In the concluding part of the article we reflect on the question of whether the
institutional changes we have seen were the effect of European interventions or of national
developments.
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